Court To Cop: You Need More Than 'Odor Of Marijuana' And Inconsistent Testimony To Justify A Warrantless Search

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When cops are looking to perform warrantless searches, the only thing more useful than drug dogs is officers' own noses. The invocation of the phrase "smell of marijuana" magically dissipates the protective shield of the Fourth Amendment, allowing officers to engage in searches that often seem to resemble "general rummaging."Every so often, this Constitutional evasion scheme fails to pay off. And it's usually because the officer engaging in a warrantless search or unjustified arrest has gotten used to getting away with it and is caught off-guard when someone questions their actions or challenges their methods.That's the case here in this Delaware Superior Court decision [PDF], coming to us via FourthAmendment.com. This suppression order is the direct result of the assertions and actions of a particularly unreliable narrator, Wilmington Police Department Detective James Wiggins.Detective Wiggins was roaming the streets in an unmarked car when he came across Ivan Cornelius sitting in his parked car. This soon turned into a full-blown search of Cornelius' vehicle, one that attracted the helping hands of six other officers before it concluded. The end result of the search was this:

Detective Wiggins claimed during direct examination that he found “a bunch of marijuana.” When pressed for more information during cross-examination, Detective Wiggins clarified and stated he meant a “bunch of leaves.” However, there was not enough to send to the lab for testing.

When asked how many leaves it would take to submit the marijuana to the state lab, Detective Wiggins replied that he does not know.

Detective Wiggins stated that it is his job “to stop things from happening before they happen” and, accordingly, to proactively stop cars and ride around looking for suspicious activity.

After being unable to state how many leaves are needed to send for testing, the Detective conceded that the lab is able to test even small, personal amounts of marijuana.

The Detective further conceded that the amount he allegedly observed was probably either less than personal use or just personal use.

Notably, it is Detective Wiggins’s understanding that he can search the entirety of a car as long as he smells marijuana. Detective Wiggins explained that, as a standard patrol officer, he would normally have to call in a traffic stop into WILCOM if he stopped a vehicle. However, as a Task Force officer, he does not need to report to WILCOM when he stops a vehicle for a traffic stop. As Detective Wiggins puts it, if he stops a car and smells marijuana, but does not issue a ticket, there would be no record of it. Moreover, Detective Wiggins estimated that he has made around a thousand traffic stops in the four years that he has been assigned to the Task Force and that he stopped around fifty vehicles the week prior.

Detective Wiggins’s initial testimony concerning his observation of the marijuana leaves and air freshener is contradicted by his later testimony. First, in response to what Detective Wiggins noticed about the car while engaging with Mr. Cornelius in the vehicle, Detective Wiggins claimed he smelled marijuana, observed marijuana leaves, and air freshener. Later, in response to Mr. Cornelius’s counsel’s statement concerning whether Detective Wiggins observed marijuana leaves before the two minutes and twenty second mark in the video, Detective Wiggins responded “I’m not sure if I’ve seen it yet or not.”

The State argues that the smell of marijuana alone is sufficient to establish probable cause. Marijuana odors, while relevant to probable-cause determinations, does not require this Court to find that probable cause exists in every circumstance on sole basis of the odor. Probable cause determinations are made by evaluating the totality of the circumstances.For instance, in Law v. State, the vehicle’s speed, the occupant’s extreme nervousness, and the odor of marijuana contributed to the Court’s determination that probable cause existed for the search of the car. Likewise, in Valentine v. State, the occupant’s excessive speed, the time of day, and the odor of marijuana contributed to the Court’s determination that probable cause existed.

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WIPO Says Johnson & Johnson Can't Seize Parody Website Suggesting Band Aids With Corporate Sponsors

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Danielle Baskin is something of a brilliant creative force who constantly comes up with hilarious art projects/commentary/satire -- some of which end up turning into actual businesses. This included, somewhat recently, her Maskalike business that would print yours (or someone else's?) face on a mask. That operation just closed up shop, but was quite popular in the midst of the pandemic. She's also created satirical services such as one that puts blue checks on your home (a la being "verified" on Twitter or Facebook) or stained glass film over airplane windows, or a "Decruiter" service to help you figure out when to quite your job, or a hoodie that will let you replace corporate logos with velcro. There's also the website that runs obituaries for expired domain names.There are many more of these kinds of projects listed on her website. One of her attention-getting projects from a few years ago was Branded Fruit, where she would... well... do what it says, and put a corporate brand on a piece of fruit.Perhaps somewhat inspired by the success of the Branded Fruit project while thinking about the pandemic, the vaccines, and the rush to turn just about anything these days into a branding opportunity, a few months back Basken set up Brand-Aid™ at the website BrandedBandAid.com. It's a clever bit of commentary on the nature of the commercialization of health care these days.

Here, the Panel considers that the phrase chosen by Respondent in the Domain Name - brandedbandaids - does not itself convey parody of Complainant, its trademarks, and related products. Moreover, and while the Panel tends not to find Respondent's arguments on this point terribly persuasive, it is also at least debatable whether the website linked to the Domain Name targets Complainant and its BAND-AID marks, or rather is intended as a more general parody of the capitalization of public health, as initially claimed by Respondent. See e.g., A&F Trademark, Inc. and Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. supra (In order to constitute parody, the web site must poke fun at the goods or services associated with Complainants' marks: use of another's trademark to poke fun at something unrelated to Complainant's mark is not parody.) Of course, the Panel also recognizes that Respondent has free speech interests protected as a constitutional right in the United States; however, under the law individuals do not enjoy absolute freedom of expression especially with respect to terms protected as trademarks.

Here, there is no doubt that Respondent, when registering the Domain Name, was aware of Complainant and its BAND-AID brand. The question is whether, despite that awareness, and in view of Respondent's asserted artistic parody intention for registering the Domain Name, the registration and use amounts to bad faith.Complainant has contended that Respondent's registration of the Domain Name without authorization reflects opportunistic bad faith and was intended to exploit the goodwill and fame of Complainant's marks in bad faith to improperly deceive Internet users and benefit Respondent financially. Complainant has pointed out that when Respondent initially launched her website, the disclaimer was not prominently placed and Respondent used an allegedly infringing version of the BAND-AID mark in the font and color typically used by Complainant. Further, Complainant argued that the ultimate effect of use of the Domain Name will be to cause confusion with Complainant, and thus the registration and use of the Domain Name must be considered to be in bad faith. Complainant has sought to emphasize that Respondent's use should not be considered purely noncommercial because an Internet user, by using the link to Respondent's Twitter account and then clicking through to her personal website, could be introduced to commercial ventures offered by Respondent.In the face of these contentions, Respondent has argued that while a given use may or may not meet the standards for the parody defense, it may still be a sufficiently plausible, good-faith motive to overcome Complainant's proposed inference of bad faith within the meaning of the Policy. Given the facts and circumstances of this case, the Panel agrees with Respondent on this point. See The California Milk Processor Board supra (This may or may not meet the standards for the parody defense under United States trademark law, but it is a sufficiently plausible, good-faith motive to outweigh the Complainant's inference of bad faith within the meaning of the Policy.). Respondent has provided evidence to demonstrate that she is, in fact, an artist who engages in parody of the Internet, capitalism, online businesses and the technology industry more generally, while using websites, domain names and social media. Respondent has not demonstrated any interest in selling or transferring the Domain Name, nor is there evidence that she has previously made a practice of acquiring domain names resembling trademarks for sale. Respondent has claimed that the website linked to the Domain Name has no revenue or plan to seek revenue, and has submitted a sworn affidavit to this effect:I registered and used the website solely for the purpose of artistic parody. At no time have I ever sought commercial benefit from either the website or from the registration of the domain name.The evidence in this case supports Respondent's assertion concerning noncommercial use. As for the link on the Domain Name's website to Respondent's Twitter account, which in turn might be used to link to Respondent's personal website that reflects one or more commercial ventures, the Panel finds that this path is too attenuated such that it would by itself disqualify the Domain Name from noncommercial use. Further, since being contacted by Complainant's counsel, Respondent has taken steps - through a disclaimer on the website and changing the font and color of text on the site - to respond to Complainant's demands concerning the content of the website. This point is important because UDRP panels tend to assess relevant facts concerning use of a domain name with a view to the circumstances prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint, and Respondent made the relevant changes before the Complaint was filed. See WIPO Overview 3.0, section 2.11. Ultimately, and acknowledging that the Policy criteria are non-exclusive, looking at paragraph 4(b)(iv) in particular, the Panel finds that owing to the credibility of the sworn assertion as to the noncommercial nature of the Domain Name and attendant website, the Domain Name was not registered and used in bad faith.Finally, the Panel emphasizes that the decision in this case is limited to the criteria under the Policy, and the Panel makes no findings concerning the parties' rights under applicable national law - which may in any event be better suited for determination by a court.Complainant has failed its burden to demonstrate that the Domain Name was registered in bad faith.

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