It didn't take long for Citizen -- the app that once wanted to be a cop -- to wear out its law enforcement welcome. The crime reporting app has made several missteps since its inception, beginning with its original branding as "Vigilante."Having been booted from app stores for encouraging (unsurprisingly) vigilantism, the company rebranded as "Citizen," hooking um… citizens up with live feeds of crime reports from city residents as well as transcriptions of police scanner output. It also paid citizens to show up uninvited at crime scenes to report on developing situations.But it never forgot its vigilante origins. When wildfires swept across Southern California last year, Citizen's principals decided it was time to put the "crime" back in "crime reporting app." The problem went all the way to the top, with Citizen CEO Andrew Frame dropping into Slack conversations and live streams, imploring employees and app users to "FIND THIS FUCK."The problem was Citizen had identified the wrong "FUCK." The person the app claimed was responsible for the wildfire wasn't actually the culprit. Law enforcement later tracked down a better suspect, one who had actually generated some evidence implicating them.After calling an innocent person a "FUCK" and a "devil" in need of finding, Citizen was forced to walk back its vigilantism and rehabilitate its image. Unfortunately for Citizen, this act managed to burn bridges with local law enforcement just as competently as the wildfire it had used to start a vastly ill-conceived manhunt.As Joseph Cox reports for Motherboard, this act ignited the last straw that acted as a bridge between Citizen and one of the nation's largest law enforcement agencies, the Los Angeles Police Department. Internal communications obtained by Vice show the LAPD decided to cut ties with the app after the company decided its internal Slack channel was capable of taking the law into its own hands.
On May 21, several days after the misguided manhunt, Sergeant II Hector Guzman, a member of the LAPD Public Communications Group, emailed colleagues with a link to some of the coverage around the incident.“I know the meeting with West LA regarding Citizen was rescheduled (TBD), but here’s a recent article you might want to look at in advance of the meeting, which again highlights some of the serious concerns with Citizen, and the user actions they promote and condone,” Guzman wrote. Motherboard obtained the LAPD emails through a public records request.Lieutenant Raul Jovel from the LAPD’s Media Relations Division replied “given what is going on with this App, we will not be working with them from our shop.”Guzman then replied “Copy. I concur.”
Whatever lucrative possibilities Citizen might have envisioned after making early inroads towards law enforcement acceptance were apparently burnt to a crisp by this misapprehension that nearly led to a calamitous misapprehension. Rather than entertain Citizen's mastubatorial fantasies about being the thin app line between good and evil, the LAPD (wisely) chose to kick the upstart to the curb.The stiff arm continues to this day. The LAPD cut ties and has continued to swipe left on Citizen's extremely online advances. The same Sgt. Guzman referenced in earlier emails has ensured the LAPD operates independently of Citizen. When Citizen asked the LAPD if it would be ok to eavesdrop on radio chatter to send out push notifications to users about possible criminal activity, Guzman made it clear this would probably be a bad idea.
“It’s come up before. Always turned down for several reasons,” Guzman wrote in another email.
And now Citizen goes it alone in Los Angeles. In response to Motherboard's reporting, Citizen offered up word salad about good intentions and adjusting to "real world operational experiences." I guess that's good, in a certain sense. From the statement, it appears Citizen is willing to learn from its mistakes. The problem is its mistakes have been horrific rather than simply inconvenient, and it appears to be somewhat slow on the uptake, which only aggravates problems that may be caused by over-excited execs thinking a few minutes of police scanner copy should result in citizen arrests.
Summary:On March 10 2021, the Russian Government deliberately slowed down access to Twitter after it accused the platform of repeatedly failing to remove posts about illegal drug use, child pornography, and pushing minors towards suicide. State communications watchdog Roskomnadzor (RKN) claimed that “throttling” the speed of uploading and downloading images and videos on Twitter was to protect its citizens by making its content less accessible. Using Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology, RKN essentially filtered internet traffic for Twitter-related domains. As part of Russia’s controversial 2019 Sovereign Internet Law, all Russian Internet Service Providers (ISPs) were required to install this technology, which allows internet traffic to be filtered, rerouted, and blocked with granular rules through a centralized system. In this example, it blocked or slowed down access to specific content (images and videos) rather than the entire service. DPI technology also gives Russian authorities unilateral and automatic access to ISPs’ information systems and access to keys to decrypt user communications.
Twitter throttling in Russia meme. Translation: “Runet users; Twitter”
The University of Michigan’s researchers reported connection speeds to Twitter users were reduced on average by 87 percent and some Russian internet service providers reported a wider slowdown in access. Inadvertently, this throttling affected all website domains that included the substring t.co (Twitter’s shortened domain name), including Microsoft.com, Reddit.com, Russian state operated news site rt.com and several other Russian Government websites, including RKN’s own.Although reports suggest that Twitter has a limited user base in Russia, perhaps as low as 3% of the population (from an overall population of 144 million), it is popular with politicians, journalists and opposition figures. The ‘throttling’ of access was likely intended as a warning shot to other platforms and a test of Russia’s technical capabilities. Russian parliamentarian, Aleksandr Khinshtein, an advocate of the 2019 Sovereign Internet Law, was quoted as saying that: Putting the brakes on Twitter traffic “will force all other social networks and large foreign internet companies to understand Russia won’t silently watch and swallow the flagrant ignoring of our laws.” The companies would have to obey Russian rules on content or “lose the possibility to make money in Russia.” — Aleksandr KhinshteinThe Russian Government has a history of trying to limit and control citizen’s access and use of social media. In 2018, it tried and ultimately failed to shut down Telegram, a popular messaging app. Telegram, founded by the Russian émigré, Pavel Durov, refused to hand over its encryption keys to RKN, despite a court order. Telegram was able to thwart the shutdown attempts by shifting the hosting of its website to Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services through ‘domain fronting’ – which the Russian Government later banned. The Government eventually backed down in the face of technical difficulties and strong public opposition. Many news outlets suggest that these incidents demonstrate that Russia, where the internet has long been a last bastion of free speech as the government has shuttered independent news organizations and obstructed political opposition, is now tipping towards the more tightly controlled Chinese model and replicating aspects of its famed Great Fire Wall – including creating home-grown alternatives to Western platforms. They also warn that as Russian tactics become bolder and its censorship technology more technically sophisticated – they will be easily co-opted and scaled up by other autocratic governments.Company considerations:
To what extent should companies comply with such types of government demands?
Where do companies draw the line between acquiescing to government demands/local law that are contrary to its values or could result in human rights violations vs expanding into a market or ensuring that its users have access?
To what extent should companies align their response and/or mitigation strategies with that of other (competitor) US companies affected in a similar way by local regulation?
Should companies try to circumvent the ‘throttling’ or access restrictions through technical means such as reconfiguring content delivery networks?
Should companies alert its users that their government is restricting/throttling access?
Issue considerations:
When are government takedown requests too broad and overreaching? Who – companies, governments, civil society, a platform’s users – should decide when that is the case?
How transparent should companies be with its users about why certain content is taken down because of government requests and regulation? Would there be times when companies should not be too transparent?
What can users and advocacy groups do to challenge government restrictions on access to a platform?
Should – as the United Nations suggest – access to the internet be seen as a part of a suite of digital human rights?
