Bruce Lee's Estate Gets Stiff Roundhouse Kick After Trying To Block Theater Company's Trademark

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Those steeped in ownership culture often have the wrong idea when it comes to trademark laws. In the minds of some, trademark laws can be used like publicity rights laws, wherein a famous somebody -- or that somebody's heirs -- can use that fame to control all uses of references to that somebody for ever and ever. That, of course, is not how trademark laws work. Instead, trademark law is designed to protect the public from confusion by allowing some monopolistic use of names and terms in some markets and only if actual commerce is taking place.This is a lesson the management company of the late renowned martial arts star Bruce Lee has now learned the hard way. Bruce Lee Enterprises attempted to both block the trademark registration for production company Barisons in the UK, which applied for a mark covering its forthcoming Jun Fan: the Bruce Lee Musical, and also to apply for a "Jun Fan" mark in the theatrical designation itself. Jun Fan, if you're not aware, was the birth name of Bruce Lee.The problem for BLE is that Barisons had already communicated its intention to put on the show with BLE and defended itself by accusing BLE of registering for its own trademark purely to block the production company's show, without any intention of putting on its own theatrical production.

Barisons claimed that BLE filed its trademark application as a blocking tactic and without any genuine intention to use the mark. As a result, the theatre company opposed the application and argued that it was made in bad faith and should be refused.BLE filed a counter-statement denying the allegation and said that it filed the application to protect Lee’s IP rights and to expand the Bruce Lee brand in the UK.In February 2017, Barisons itself filed an application to register ‘Jun Fan the Musical’, also in class 41 in relation to theatre production and musical theatre.

Allan James of the IPO said that BLE had failed to show that the name Jun Fan has a reputation in the UK at the relevant date of the applied-for trademark. James also said that BLE knew that the musical was to be called “Jun Fan: the Bruce Lee Musical”. He added that personality rights do not exist under UK law and that BLE’s trademark application covered the same services that Barisons intended on offering. James said that there was no evidence that BLE’s previous trademark applications covered theatrical shows in any other territories in class 41, and that the estate had no intention of offering such services.“I therefore find that insofar as it covered theatrical shows in class 41, BLE’s trademark was purely a blocking mechanism to obstruct Barisons’ proposed musical,” said James.

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Iowa Supreme Court Thinks Things Are Too Tough For Bad Cops, Adopts Qualified Immunity Defense

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The Iowa Supreme Court has decided to lower standards for law enforcement officers in its state. The ruling [PDF] issued earlier this summer gives state officers the opportunity to dismiss lawsuits against them by asserting qualified immunity. Prior to this decision, there was no qualified immunity defense state actors could raise in court. They were actually forced to actually defend themselves in court, making it easier for plaintiffs' claims to survive an early motion to dismiss and bringing them closer to justice. (via Bleeding Heartland)The case -- Baldwin v. City of Estherville -- involves an arrest for a crime that didn't exist. It involves driving an ATV through a city-owned ditch, something that's illegal under state law but not under the City of Estherville's laws. An arrest for something that wasn't actually illegal was followed by this lawsuit. It's a weird origin for a Fourth Amendment lawsuit, but the outcome makes holding officers accountable for their misdeeds much more difficult with the court's addition of qualified immunity to local government's litigation toolbox.A lot of discussion of other states and their local immunity defenses -- as well as whether or not Constitutional cases are torts rather than strict liability issues -- leads the court to the following conclusion:

Accordingly, with respect to a damage claim under article I, sections 1 and 8, a government official whose conduct is being challenged will not be subject to damages liability if she or he pleads and proves as an affirmative defense that she or he exercised all due care to conform to the requirements of the law.

I begin by emphasizing that the policy-oriented federal doctrine of statutory qualified immunity does not provide a model for determining whether individuals are entitled to qualified immunity for Iowa constitutional torts. The federal doctrine of statutory qualified immunity progressively dilutes legal norms, embraces numerous false assumptions, fails to recognize the important role of juries in restraining government, and is inconsistent with important tenets of Iowa law.

We should not voluntarily drape our constitutional law with the heavy chains of indefensible doctrine. We should aim to eliminate fictions in our law and be honest and forthright on the important question of what happens when officers of the law commit constitutional wrongs that inflict serious reputational, emotional, and financial harms on our citizens.

The importance of effective enforcement of search and seizure restrictions on government was not lost on the generation of lawyers and judges who witnessed the collapse of the rule of law in central Europe in the 1930s. As Chief Nuremburg Prosecutor Justice Robert Jackson so eloquently opined after his return from his assignment in immediate postwar Germany,"search and seizure rights are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government."

In short, when citizens suffer potentially grievous harms from unconstitutional conduct in violation of article I, section 1 or article I, section 8, we should require the officials who engaged in the unconstitutional conduct to bear the burden of the loss. We should not allow the officials who engage in unconstitutional conduct to respond to the prayer of the harmed citizen with, “Aw, tough luck. Tut tut. Bye bye.”

A recent study by Professor Joanna Schwartz confirms what one might suspect, namely, that at least with respect to police officers, local governments almost always indemnify for settlements and judgments arising out of misconduct lawsuits. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 912 (2014). Specifically, the Schwartz study found that in the forty-four largest jurisdictions studied, police officers paid .02% of the over $730 million paid for misconduct suits between 2006 and 2011. In the thirty-seven smaller police departments included in the study, Schwartz found there were no officer contributions towards settlements and judgments during that time. In short, according to Schwartz, in many jurisdictions “officers are more likely to be struck by lightning than they are to contribute to a settlement or judgment in a police misconduct suit.” Id. at 914. The fact that officers are almost always indemnified undercuts one of the primary arguments in favor of the immunity doctrine—that without it, officers will be deterred from engaging in appropriate activities for fear of the financial consequences of a wrong decision.

Rather than follow the state’s motto, “Our Liberties We Prize and Our Rights We Will Maintain,” the majority follows an approach that suggests “Our Liberties Are Transient and Our Rights Are Expendable.”[...]The majority’s finding that the speculative overdeterrence of actions of officials is weighty while the risk of underdeterrence of unconstitutional conduct infringing on individual rights is not mentioned at all, suggests a results-oriented jurisprudence that favors government officials who inflict unconstitutional harms over citizens who endure them.

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Chicago Court: Yeah, Billy Goat Tavern Is Probably Going To Lose Trademark Case, But It Can Go Forward Anyway

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Earlier this year, we discussed a trademark lawsuit brought by the famous Billy Goat Tavern in Chicago against a chip company in Missouri called the Billy Goat Chip Co. At issue was the tavern's claim that the chip company's name and logos infringed on its trademarks. Interestingly, Billy Goat Chip Co. countersued with seemingly important information, including that it had been operating for a decade, had trademarks for its business for a decade, and that its branding differences were such that the potential for public confusion didn't exist. The Billy Goat Tavern, on the other hand, only had trademarks for its name for the tavern industry and didn't begin selling packaged food until 2017, at which time the tavern applied for marks in that industry as well.Honestly, the whole thing seems fairly cut and dry. Different markets, different products, and the very real potential that the chip company could get the tavern's trademarks cancelled based on its own first use. Yet, despite the Chicago judge presiding over the case essentially agreeing when ruling on Billy Goat Chip's motion to dismiss, the court is allowing all of this to go trial.

The main argument was that the tavern’s Lanham Act claims should be dismissed because owners should’ve known about the chips in 2010, and expressly knew the chips were on the market in Chicago in 2014, yet didn’t initiate a lawsuit until 2017.“In this case, there are too many unknown and disputed facts that preclude judgment,” Dow wrote, explaining that the Lanham Act itself has no statutory limitations, but courts in the same circuit routinely apply the three-year limits enumerated in the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. He said the proceedings thus far give the appearance the chip company is correct about the tavern’s constructive notice in 2010 and actual notice in 2014, but he “cannot determine from the pleadings and exhibits whether Plaintiff’s delay in filing suit was inexcusable or whether Defendant would be prejudiced by allowing plaintiff to bring its claims now.”

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Court Tells Government It Can't Search A House Just Because A Suspected Drug Dealer Once Parked In Its Driveway

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The "good faith" exception can be difficult to overcome. Courts seem willing to grant the government this Fourth Amendment workaround even when it seems apparent the government operated in bad faith.

Take, for instance, the FBI's Playpen investigation. On the strength of a single warrant issued in Virginia, the FBI, in essence, searched computers all over the nation (and all over the world) to extract identifying info about the devices' users. Even when courts found the warrant to be invalid because of its blatant disregard for jurisdictional limitations (warrants can only be executed in the district they're issued), they still granted the government "good faith" because the FBI agent had relied on the judge's approval of the warrant to execute the search.

But this was happening while the FBI was petitioning the rest of the government to remove jurisdictional limitations with amendments to Rule 41. So, this warrant was obtained while limits the FBI wanted lifted were in place, but its execution took place before the limits were lifted. Somehow, this was still considered "good faith," even if those overseeing the warrant and investigation knew the FBI planned to violate jurisdictional limitations with the deployment of its PII-scraping malware.

This is only a small part of the federal court system's deference to law enforcement. "Good faith" is supposed to be the exception, not the rule, but hundreds of court rulings on evidence suppression bend over backwards to view law enforcement actions in the best possible light, even as evidence mounts outside the court system American policing is frequently unconstitutional, if not outright corrupt.

When you see a court actually reject the government's "good faith" advances, you can be certain law enforcement has screwed up severely. This case, brought to our attention by the Sixth Circuit Blog, is one of those exceptional strippings of a Fourth Amendment exception.

In this decision [PDF], the Sixth Circuit Appeals Court upholds the lower court's suppression of evidence. The Akron PD engaged in a lengthy drug investigation, but decided to take a few shortcuts to search a residence it vaguely speculated might be related to the drug dealer they were pursuing. The connective tissue of the warrant tore immediately upon judicial inspection. The supposed probable cause for an extensive, broad search of a residence? One time the guy they were surveilling parked his car in the driveway.

The target of the investigation was Camiolo Rocha-Ayon Jr. The rest of this is related to Carl Tucker -- the person challenging the evidence's legal origins -- in ways only clear to the officer requesting the warrant.

Akron Police Department Detective M.V. Gilbride sought a records-and-documents search warrant for the Saxon Avenue house. Citing his training and experience, as well as his observations on February 17, 2017 at 791 Saxon Avenue, Gilbride hypothesized that Rocha-Ayon had traveled to the residence “to collect drug proceeds from TUCKER to pay for [an] upcoming delivery of cocaine.” He further speculated that “a portion of the cocaine seized” from Rocha-Ayon was intended for Tucker, that “at least a portion of the currency recovered” from Rocha-Ayon was obtained from Tucker on February 17, and that Rocha-Ayon had purchased the vacuum sealer and bags on February 17 to conceal the odor of the currency that he was obtaining from Tucker, in the event that he was stopped by a K-9 unit during his return trip to Canal Winchester. Detective Gilbride attempted to bolster his conclusions by noting that the Summit County, Ohio Auditor’s Office listed Tucker as the owner of 791 Saxon Avenue; that Tucker was the account holder for the residence’s electric utilities; that the Akron Police Department had received a service call in October 2016, which suggested that drug dealing was occurring at the house; that, inter alia, Tucker had been convicted in 2000 for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine ; and that the affidavit had been presented to and approved by “the Akron Police Legal Advisor.”

Having perused Detective Gilbride's speculative affidavit, a local judge granted the Akron PD the permission to seize:

[b]ooks, records, receipts, notes, ledgers[,] and other papers and electronic equipment to store information relating to the possession, transportation, ordering, purchase and distribution of controlled substances, . . . bank statements and records and other items evidencing the obtaining, secreting, transfer and/or concealment and/or expenditure of money; financial proceeds, namely[,] U.S. [c]urrency, photographs, indicia of occupancy; and other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence related to drug trafficking.

So, based on the observation a drug suspect once parked in the driveway of a house owned by someone else, the PD was given free rein to seize everything in the house (if not the house itself, because, you know, "transfer/concealment/expenditure of money").

Then the government obtained a second warrant after finding a utility bill with Tucker's name on it listing an address on Penguin Ave. [Keep in mind, the supposed target of this investigation is still Rocha-Ayon, who once parked in the driveway of the Saxon Ave. residence.] This affidavit copy-pasted the Saxon Ave. speculation and dragged in a completely unrelated service call from the Akron PD to this Penguin Ave. for a domestic dispute involving Tucker. This warrant was approved as well.

The lower court said the Saxon Ave. warrant (the first one obtained) was so bare bones it could not possibly justify a search. And if that warrant was bad, it invalidated the second warrant because that one was largely based on evidence recovered during the first invalid search.

The appeals court agrees. And in doing so, it provides a crystal clear description of a "bare bones" warrant -- the kind that can't be salvaged by "good faith" pleas from the government. It also points out officers utilizing warrants like these terrible ones cannot expect a judge's signature to save them from their own better judgment.

Broadly speaking, an officer’s reliance on a search warrant is not objectively reasonable where “a reasonably well[-]trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.” One such situation is where the affidavit is “bare bones,” i.e., is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”

Everything about the Saxon Ave. warrant was garbage. And everything arising from that one -- the Penguin Ave. warrant -- is just more garbage. Here's the PD's bare bones warrant, stripped of its boilerplate and CopSpeak, bleeding to death in the harsh light of judicial examination.

The Saxon Avenue affidavit is a prototypical example of a bare-bones affidavit. Stripped down to its basics, the affidavit asserts that evidence of drug trafficking would be found at the Saxon Avenue residence because (1) a suspected drug dealer once parked in the driveway for a brief period of time, (2) the house’s owner had a 17-year-old conviction for possession with intent to distribute, and (3) a four-month-old, seemingly unverified, apparently anonymous tip suggested that drug dealing may have occurred there.

The court then drags the government's arguments on behalf of its terrible warrant into the same light and lets them soak in their own shame.

The government attempts to resist this conclusion by pointing to additional, allegedly “critical” facts contained in the Saxon Avenue affidavit. Specifically, the government notes that when Rocha-Ayon visited the residence, he was driving a car that he sometimes—but not always— used in connection with drug trafficking; that prior to his arrival on February 17, Rocha-Ayon stopped to purchase household items that are sometimes—but not always—used by drug traffickers; and that two days later, Rocha-Ayon was arrested 135 miles away while transporting cocaine. Based on these additional facts, the government claims that a reasonable law enforcement officer could “easily infer” that “ROCHA-AYON JR. [had] traveled to 791 Saxon Avenue on February 17, 2017 to collect drug proceeds from TUCKER to pay for the upcoming delivery of cocaine…"

If that's the argument the government wants to make, the court will let it. But all it does is show the officer involved in obtaining this warrant is either incredibly poorly trained or an idiot.

Contrary to the government’s assertion, no reasonably well-trained officer could draw such conclusions based upon the particularized facts in the affidavit…

Building another warrant on the skeletal framing of the first bad warrant can't save the second warrant. The court discusses the issue, but points out it doesn't even need to reach a "good faith" decision on the second warrant. It clearly sprung from the first invalid warrant/search and is similarly nothing but unconstitutional garbage. Evidence obtained from both searches is suppressed, leaving the government with its original investigation target -- the one they arrested 135 miles away from the residences searched and in which the suspect parked his car once at only one of the residences.

It's an exception to the rule that's actually supposed to be an exception. Only the worst law enforcement actions are refused the GFE pass for the halls of justice. This isn't a win for the Fourth Amendment. It just one of the few times the government's disregard for civil liberties actually results in suppressed evidence.

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